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PRIVATE EYES, THEY'RE WATCHING YOU: 
LAW ENFORCEMENT’S MONITORING 
OF SOCIAL MEDIA 
RACHEL LEVINSON-WALDMAN* 
I. Introduction 
Social media is a powerful tool that gives people the chance to connect 
and interact with others from all over the world. Users on platforms like 
Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram can easily chat or share videos and 
pictures with friends and connections in their city or across the world. On 
most social media sites, all that is generally required to connect and interact 
with another user is becoming “friends” with, or a “follower” of, that user. 
Many social media profiles are public, allowing anyone else on that 
platform to view postings, pictures, or videos.  
While most social media sites provide privacy settings to protect profiles 
so only friends or followers can see them, many people still have at least 
one social media account where they are “friends” with someone else who 
may not be a direct friend—or someone with whom they did not 
intentionally choose to connect. Indeed, social media users are frequently 
bombarded with “friend requests” from strangers or remote acquaintances, 
and they may sometimes find it easier to accept the request than spend time 
determining whether or how they know the person.  
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As a result, many social media profiles may be observed by unwanted 
viewers, including law enforcement. In fact, social media accounts are now 
being monitored and surveilled by state and local law enforcement agencies 
across the country. In this essay, I will discuss what police monitoring of 
social media means, how police carry out this surveillance, and how social 
media monitoring and surveillance can disproportionately affect—and be 
disproportionately used against—activists, communities of color, and youth 
of color.  
II. Background 
A. Statistics on Police Use and Costs of Social Media Monitoring 
The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) conducts an 
annual study in which it sends out a questionnaire to police departments 
asking whether they use social media and for what purpose. In 2015, over 
96% of the 553 departments responding reported that they used social 
media in some capacity.1 Of the 539 departments responding to the 2016 
questionnaire, social media was used by 76% for soliciting tips on crime, by 
72% for “monitoring public sentiment,” and by 70% of the departments for 
intelligence gathering.2 Given these statistics, police are using social media 
not only to send information out to the public but also to keep track of what 
people are doing both online and off.  
While police social media monitoring is prevalent, individual police 
departments vary in their use of social media monitoring and in how much 
they expend on their monitoring capabilities. Until the fall of 2016—when 
the major social platforms changed their developer policies to prohibit the 
practice—many departments bought programs from third-party software 
developers that enabled police to mine the data available on platforms, 
including the details of social networks, who was using high-profile 
hashtags, location information, and more. The Brennan Center conducted a 
study in 2016, based primarily on publicly available procurement 
documents; based on those findings, we mapped out departments across the 
country that were spending at least $10,000 on this technology.3 
                                                                                                                 
 1. 2015 Social Media Survey Results, INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE (2015), 
http://www.iacpsocialmedia.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/FULL-2015-Social-Media-
Survey-Results.compressed.pdf. 
 2. KiDeuk Kim, Ashlin Oglesby-Neal & Edward Mohr, 2016 Law Enforcement Use of 
Social Media Survey, JUSTICE POL’Y CTR (Feb. 2017), https://www.urban.org/sites/ 
default/files/publication/88661/2016-law-enforcement-use-of-social-media-survey_5.pdf. 
 3. Map: Social Media Monitoring by Police Departments, Cities, and Counties, 
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For example, in Oklahoma, the city of Tulsa spent $3,500 in 2014, the 
city of Moore spent $13,387 from 2015 to 2016, and the Oklahoma State 
Bureau of Investigations spent about $35,250 over that same period.4 
Larger jurisdictions spent much more: for instance, the County of Los 
Angeles spent nearly $200,000 on these technologies.5  
At the same time, law enforcement agencies are relatively silent about 
their use of social media monitoring tools. Only eighteen out of the 157 
jurisdictions we surveyed—roughly 10%—have publicly available policies 
explaining how they use social media monitoring to view or gather data,6 so 
many civilians are left in the dark about how their police departments are 
collecting social media information. 
B. How Police Use Social Media Information 
There are four basic methods that police departments have historically 
been able to employ to gain information through social media surveillance. 
First, police search a user’s publicly available social media accounts and 
posts. For example, if a targeted user has a public Twitter account, police 
can go on the site to check the user’s recent posts and interactions with 
other users without needing any special third-party software. Nearly all 
police departments that responded to the IACP annual study confirmed that 
they use this basic tactic in some form.  
Second, police departments may set up an undercover account to monitor 
or interact with a targeted user. This tactic comes into play when the user 
has more stringent privacy settings on his or her account, such that posts 
and pictures are not visible without their permission. As long as the user 
accepts the friend or follow request—perhaps because the undercover 
                                                                                                                 
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/map-
social-media-monitoring-police-departments-cities-and-counties [hereinafter Map: Social 
Media Monitoring]. 
 4. Purchase Order No. 0000131991 for Snap Trends, CITY OF TULSA (Sept. 30, 2014), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/POs%20_%20GovSpend_Tulsa.p
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https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/POs%20_%20GovSpend_Moore2
.pdf; Purchase Order No. 170889 for Snap Trends, CITY OF MOORE (Aug. 17, 2016), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/POs%20_%20GovSpend_Moore3
.pdf; Purchase Order No. 15-38940 for Snap Trends, CITY OF MOORE (Apr. 6, 2015), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/POs%20_%20GovSpend_Moore1
.pdf; Map: Social Media Monitoring, supra note 3, at Oklahoma State Bureau of 
Investigation. 
 5. Map: Social Media Monitoring, supra note 3, at County of Los Angeles. 
 6. Map: Social Media Monitoring, supra note 3. 
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account has a compelling profile picture or features interesting posts—the 
police can then use that account to glean otherwise private information 
about the targeted user, as well as to view comments from the users’ friends 
and contacts. About two-thirds of police departments surveyed use this 
method. Note that this would not include the capability to view private 
messages exchanged through a service like Facebook Messenger or Twitter 
direct messaging, unless the undercover officer is a party to the messages.  
Third, as discussed infra, law enforcement offices could until recently 
purchase and utilize analytical software to conduct much more 
sophisticated tracking of people, groups, or hashtags.  
Finally, police departments can use a search warrant to get information 
about a specific user, including private messages between two users. 
Police can also use social media monitoring to ascertain the location of 
users—sometimes even if the user has disabled location tracking on her 
account. Location information may be available through Wi-Fi and cellular 
data, GPS information, geotagging, network analysis and hashtags, 
keywords, or other content.  
III. The Exposé of Social Media Monitoring and Subsequent Ban on Data 
Gathering for Surveillance Purposes 
One way police departments are utilizing social media is to monitor 
hashtags, which are frequently used to talk about socially and politically 
relevant issues. One of the most prominent hashtags is #BlackLivesMatter, 
which in a space of several years has been used more than 30 million times 
on Twitter.7 Indeed, social media has been a critical avenue for political 
engagement by communities of color; a recent Pew Research Center study 
found that half of black and Hispanic users identify social media sites as 
important venues to express political views, while only 32% of white users 
agreed.8 In a similar vein, 36% of black users and 27% of Hispanic users 
said social media is very important for getting elected officials to pay 
attention to issues, compared to 19% of white users.9 As the Pew study 
indicated, a majority of Americans overall agreed that social media can 
                                                                                                                 
 7. Monica Anderson et al., Activism in the Social Media Age, PEW RES. CTR.: INFO. & 
TECH., at 3, (July 11, 2018), http://www.pewinternet.org/2018/07/11/activism-in-the-social-
media-age/.  
 8. Id. at 2. 
 9. Id. 
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“help give a voice to underrepresented groups” and “make it easier to hold 
powerful people accountable.” 10  
The Pew Research study makes materials unearthed by the ACLU of 
Northern California (ACLU) especially relevant. The ACLU was interested 
in how companies were advertising their social media monitoring services 
to police departments as a way to get insight into how police were using 
those technologies. The ACLU sent sixty-three requests to police 
departments throughout California and discovered that providers were 
marketing their products as a way to monitor lawful protestors. 11  
A company called Geofeedia, for instance, emailed prosecutors and 
police departments to boast that it could create undercover accounts and 
follow hashtags to track lawful protests like those in Ferguson, Missouri.12 
The company also noted that it could create an unlimited number of fake 
accounts to monitor private users.13 This is in violation of Facebook’s terms 
of service, which requires users to use more or less their real name, to 
represent themselves truthfully, and to hold only one account.14  
In a separate follow-up e-mail to a district attorney’s office, Geofeedia 
advised that “[s]ince we last spoke we have started working with several 
district attorney’s offices around the country, [sic] monitoring for protests 
and investigations are driving this move.”15 In effect, the company was 
focusing on using social media to monitor largely lawful protestors. 
After uncovering these documents, the ACLU of California, Center for 
Media Justice, and Color of Change took this information to the social 
media companies to highlight that the platforms were being used to surveil 
their users for engaging in constitutionally-protected activities.16  
In response, during the fall and winter of 2016, the three major social 
media platforms—Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram—banned developers 
                                                                                                                 
 10. Id. at 10. 
 11. Matt Cagle, Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter Provided Data Access for a 
Surveillance Product Marketed to Target Activists of Color, ACLU: N. CAL. (Oct. 11, 2016), 
https://www.aclunc.org/blog/facebook-instagram-and-twitter-provided-data-access-
surveillance-product-marketed-target.  
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Terms of Service, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms, at “3. Your 
Commitments to Facebook and Our Community” (last visited Mar. 12, 2019). 
 15. Email from Geofeedia Representative to Sacramento County District Attorney’s 
Office (Jul. 11, 2016, 06:33 AM), https://www.aclunc.org/docs/20161011_geofeedia_das_ 
monitoring_protests.pdf.  
 16. Cagle, supra note 11. 
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from using their data for surveillance purposes.17 This ban did not prevent 
police investigators or anyone else from viewing public profiles 
individually or searching manually for specific hashtags or location 
keywords. However, companies that developed software for the purpose of 
large-scale social media monitoring, which gathered and analyzed much 
larger quantities of data than an individual user could, were barred from 
using the platforms’ data for that purpose.18 As a result of the ban, the 
major monitoring companies either closed down or had to refocus their 
strategies and services towards other clients.19 
These changes—and the nature of social media overall—pose a 
dilemma. Some content posted on social media is likely to be of significant, 
and legitimate, interest to law enforcement—for instance, an admission of a 
serious crime. At the same time, there are both practical and philosophical 
questions about how police can use social media to find that information. 
Conducting indiscriminate monitoring in hopes of coming across 
incriminating content makes it likely that communities that have 
traditionally been the focus of policing—primarily communities of color—
will be disproportionately targeted online as well.20 This practice also 
magnifies the risk of incidentally surveilling individuals engaged in First 
Amendment-protected activities, like organizing for political purposes, or 
using monitoring ostensibly directed at criminal activity as a pretext for 
collecting data about constitutionally protected pursuits. Moreover, because 
                                                                                                                 
 17. See Elizabeth Dwoskin, Facebook Says Police Can’t Use Its Data for 
“Surveillance,” WASH. POST (Mar. 13, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
switch/wp/2017/ 
03/13/facebook-says-police-cant-use-its-data-for-surveillance/?utm_term=.9ca7fa5f3eb8; 
David Gilmour & Dell Cameron, Twitter Cuts Off Third Surveillance Firm for Encouraging 
Police to Spy on Activists, DAILY DOT (Feb. 24, 2017, 11:41 AM), https://www.dailydot. 
com/layer8/media-sonar-twitter-social-media-monitoring/; April Glaser & Kurt Wagner, 
Twitter Reminds Everyone It Won’t Cooperate with Government or Police Surveillance, 
RECODE (Nov. 22, 2016, 9:24 PM EST), https://www.recode.net/2016/11/22/13719876/ 
twitter-surveillance-policy-dataminr-fbi.  
 18. Amina Elahi, Geofeedia Cuts Half of Staff After Losing Access to Twitter, 
Facebook, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 21, 2016, 5:16 PM), 
https://www.chicagotribune.com/bluesky/originals/ct-geofeedia-cuts-jobs-surveillance-bsi-
20161121-story.html. 
 19. See, e.g., id.; Lani Rosales, Snaptrends Quietly Lays Off Entire Staff, Ceases 
Operations, AM. GENIUS (Oct. 31, 2016), https://theamericangenius.com/business-
news/snaptrends-quietly-lays-off-entire-staff-ceases-operations/.  
 20. Kashmir Hill, The Wildly Unregulated Practice of Undercover Cops Friending 
People on Facebook, ROOT (Oct. 23, 2018, 1:30 PM), https://www.theroot.com/the-wildly-
unregulated-practice-of-undercover-cops-frie-1828731563.  
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these tools were so lucrative for the companies involved, it seems unlikely 
that this field will dry up entirely, though it remains to be seen exactly how 
the companies will offer their services.  
For example, Babel Street, a D.C.-area company that transacts with 
companies in the defense community, is marketing social media monitoring 
services with a wrinkle. Babel Street advertises to defense companies that it 
can gather users’ information from public social media, but it does not give 
the acquired raw data to law enforcement; instead, Babel Street analyzes the 
data, packages it, and sells to law enforcement in its modified form.21 Other 
companies are targeting schools and school districts, playing off fears of 
school shootings and other potential threats.22 
IV. Case Studies 
The next question worth answering is: does it matter? People post to 
social media all the time, with varying assumptions about what happens to 
their data once it’s been posted. Some people may be unaware of the ways 
in which their social media information may be used, while other users may 
be cautious about what they choose to share or whom they accept as a 
friend or follower. One could argue that users are knowingly accepting the 
risk when they share information on public social media sites. But to 
answer the question of whether social media monitoring matters, it is 
important to understand first how police departments are using social 
media, and second, what constitutional concerns arise from the police’s use 
of social media. 
A. Memphis Police Department 
The first case study involves the Memphis Police Department, which 
used social media monitoring tactics to monitor protestors and communities 
of color. Memphis police officers set up a fake Facebook profile, with the 
name Bob Smith and a generic profile picture, so they could develop online 
friendships with targeted users.23 The police officers used this Bob Smith 
                                                                                                                 
 21. See Aaron Gregg, For This Company, Online Surveillance Leads to Profit in 
Washington’s Suburbs, WASH. POST (Sept. 10, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
business/economy/for-this-company-online-surveillance-leads-to-profit-in-washingtons-
suburbs/2017/09/08/6067c924-9409-11e7-89fa-bb822a46da5b_story.html?utm_term=. 
113c0f355eb2.  
 22. Tom Simonite, Schools Are Mining Students’ Social Media Posts for Signs of 
Trouble, WIRED (Aug. 20, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/algorithms-
monitor-student-social-media-posts/.  
 23. Antonia Noori Farzan, Memphis Police Used Fake Facebook Account to Monitor 
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profile to send friend requests to people who were active in the organizing 
community in Memphis, including Black Lives Matters activists; if the 
targeted user accepted the friend request, the Memphis police would be able 
to see everything the user had posted, exchange direct messages with the 
user, and even view and collect information about other users who 
commented on and “liked” the activist’s posts.24  
The Memphis police used information gleaned from Facebook to create 
dossiers on activists, which were distributed internally among the Memphis 
police department.25 The officers also used the Bob Smith profile to keep 
track of organizers around the community and flag not only protests and 
community meetings but also events like block parties or school supply 
drives.26 These types of events would then end up on the internal dossier 
kept by the police. A police department’s primary role is to serve and keep 
people safe; tracking block parties and backpack events wastes time and 
resources and undermines the relationship between the police and the 
community.  
The ACLU challenged these dossiers, arguing that in the absence of any 
allegations of criminal activity, the practices violated a late-1970s consent 
decree prohibiting officers from surveilling non-criminals.27 After the 
ACLU initiated its lawsuit against the City of Memphis, the city argued that 
the consent decree was outdated and was designed without the internet in 
mind, and therefore only addressed in-person meetings, not online 
interactions.28 The judge ruled recently that the case could go forward, 
which indicates that the ACLU at least has a colorable argument that the 
police department violated the consent decree.29 
                                                                                                                 
Black Lives Matter, Trial Reveals, WASH. POST (Aug. 23, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2018/08/23/memphis-police-used-
fake-facebook-account-to-monitor-black-lives-matter-trial-reveals/?noredirect=on&utm_ 
term=.670e5da474be.  
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. ACLU of Tennessee Joins Lawsuit Challenging Memphis Police Spying on Political 
Groups, ACLU (Mar. 2, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/news/aclu-tennessee-joins-lawsuit-
challenging-memphis-police-spying-political-groups. 
 28. Yolanda Jones, Judge Issues Sanctions Against City for Violating Consent Decree, 
DAILY MEMPHIAN (Oct. 26, 2018, 9:59 PM CT), https://dailymemphian.com/article/930/ 
Judge-issues-sanctions-against-city-for-violating-consent-decree. 
 29. Since this talk was delivered, the court ruled that the city had violated the consent 
decree; the judge ordered the city to implement new policies and training protocols and 
appointed a monitor to oversee the process. In the interest of full disclosure, I have joined 
the monitoring team as a subject matter expert on social media monitoring. See id. 
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B. Boston Police Department 
The Boston Police Department also engaged in monitoring and 
surveillance of users on social media. From 2014 to 2016, the Boston Police 
Department paid Geofeedia, the company discussed in Part II supra, to 
track protestors and hashtags on Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, and 
Twitter.30 In 2014, after the shooting of Mike Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, 
the Boston police used Geofeedia to track hashtags related to Ferguson, 
protests, and Black Lives Matter.31 In 2016, the Boston Police Department 
used Geofeedia to track the Muslim Lives Matter hashtag, as well as terms 
common within the Muslim community.32 As in Memphis, the Boston 
Police Department monitored these users in the absence of any indication of 
wrongdoing or criminal activity.33 Instead, the Boston police simply tracked 
hashtags associated with particular minority groups. As a result of their 
surveillance efforts, Boston police officers collected nearly two thousand 
posts from tracked terms.34  
C. Other Jurisdictions Utilizing Social Media Monitoring 
The Baltimore Police Department has arguably been a repeat offender in 
terms of both the police technology they use and the lack of transparency 
around that technology.35 During the Freddie Gray riots, the Baltimore 
County Police used Geofeedia for real-time, location-based surveillance, 
including running photos from social media through real-time facial 
recognition software, so police could identify people with outstanding 
warrants and arrest them on the spot.36 The City of Baltimore also 
                                                                                                                 
 30. Iqra Asghar, Boston Police Used Social Media Surveillance for Years Without 
Informing City Council, ACLU (Feb. 8, 2018, 12:45 PM), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/internet-privacy/boston-police-used-social-
media-surveillance-years-without. 
 31. Id.  
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See Nasser Eledroos & Kade Crockford, Social Media Monitoring in Boston: Free 
Speech in the Crosshairs, PRIVACY SOS, https://privacysos.org/social-media-monitoring-
boston-free-speech-crosshairs/ (last accessed Mar. 29, 2019).  
 35. Benjamin Powers, Eyes Over Baltimore: How Police Use Military Technology to 
Secretly Track You, ROLLING STONE (Jan. 6, 2017, 7:27 PM ET), https://www. 
rollingstone.com/culture/culture-features/eyes-over-baltimore-how-police-use-military-
technology-to-secretly-track-you-126885/.  
 36. Id.; Baltimore County Police Department and Geofeedia Partner to Protect the 
Public During Freddie Gray Riots, GEOFEEDIA (2016), 
https://www.aclunc.org/docs/20161011_ 
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contracted with Geofeedia to “continuously monitor and record social 
media,” including setting up alert notifications that were “triggered by 
specific key words, phrases or users.”37 
In Oregon, the Director of Civil Rights at the Oregon Department of 
Justice discovered that police were monitoring him after he posted tweets 
that used the phrase “Black Lives Matter”; the Salem, Oregon police were 
using a monitoring software that was flagging that and similar hashtags.38 
The Director also learned the police were creating a dossier on him for 
using this term. After he sued,39 the Attorney General fired the agent 
overseeing the monitoring and instructed Oregon law enforcement to cease 
using monitoring software.40 
Nationally, the federal government also utilizes social media to track 
people of interest. The Department of Homeland Security has used 
Facebook and Twitter to monitor protests in Baltimore, Washington, D.C., 
Ferguson, and New York City.41 The Department of Homeland Security 
also monitored Deray McKesson, an activist for racial justice and a leader 
in the Black Lives Matter community, because the DHS considered him a 
“professional protestor.”42 The Department even spent money monitoring 
                                                                                                                 
geofeedia_baltimore_case_study.pdf.  
 37. Alison Knezevich, Police in Baltimore, Surrounding Communities Using Geofeedia 
to Monitor Social Media Posts, BALT. SUN (Sept. 5, 2016, 5:59 PM), https://www. 
baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/investigations/bs-md-geofeedia-police-20160902-story. 
html.  
 38. See Nigel Jaquiss, Oregon Department of Justice Civil Rights Chief Intends to Sue 
His Agency over Black Lives Matter Surveillance, WILLAMETTE WK. (Oct. 3, 2016), 
https://www.wweek.com/news/2016/04/15/oregon-department-of-justice-civil-rights-chief-
intends-to-sue-his-agency-over-black-lives-matter-surveillance/. 
 39. See generally Complaint, Johnson v. Rosenblum, No. EEEMRC160406-40462, (Or. 
Bureau of Lab. and Indus. Apr. 5, 2016), https://s3.amazonaws.com/wapopartners.com/ 
wweek-wp/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/15172052/Johnson-complaint.pdf.  
 40. Dana Tims, Justice Department Investigator Fired over Black Lives Matter 
Profiling Scandal, OREGONIAN: OREGONLIVE (Oct. 26, 2016), 
https://www.oregonlive.com/politics/ 
2016/10/black_lives_matter_profiling.html.  
 41. George Joseph, Exclusive: Feds Regularly Monitored Black Lives Matter Since 
Ferguson, INTERCEPT (July 24, 2015), https://theintercept.com/2015/07/24/documents-show-
department-homeland-security-monitoring-black-lives-matter-since-ferguson/.  
 42. Jason Leopold, Emails Show Feds Have Monitored ‘Professional Protestor’ DeRay 
Mckesson, VICE NEWS (Aug. 11, 2015), https://news.vice.com/en_us/article/qv58n3/emails-
show-feds-have-monitored-professional-protester-deray-mckesson; see also Lee Fang, Why 
Was an FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force Tracking a Black Lives Matter Protest?, INTERCEPT 
(Mar. 12, 2015, 6:12 PM), https://theintercept.com/2015/03/12/fbi-appeared-use-informant-
track-black-lives-matter-protest/.  
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D.C.’s Funk Parade.43 These case studies illustrate the use of social media 
monitoring tools not to track criminal activity, but to target communities of 
color for taking part in constitutionally protected pursuits. 
D. Use of Social Media in Criminal Cases  
Of course, social media can contain evidence of criminal intent as well. 
In 2014, the New York Police Department (NYPD) and the Manhattan 
District Attorney’s Office (Manhattan DA) prosecuted the largest gang case 
in New York City’s history.44 The indictments in that case relied on 
hundreds of references in Facebooks posts and messages where gang 
members bragged about murders and asked about drugs and robberies.45 
The NYPD and Manhattan DA reviewed over a million social media pages 
during the investigation and indicted over a hundred people.46 The use of 
social media in criminal investigations can have a darker side as well, 
however. 
1. Jelani Henry 
Jelani Henry was a teen who grew up in New York City. He and his 
brother Asheem were members of a “crew,” which is not a gang but is a 
sort of affiliation of neighborhood kids who hang out together.47 While 
Asheem had committed some crimes as a crew member, Jelani himself had 
stayed in the background and away from criminal activity.48 When he was 
erroneously picked out of a lineup for committing attempted murder, 
however, he was described in court proceedings as a member of a “violent 
gang”—on the grounds that he had appeared on social media in pictures 
with other members of the crew, and had commented on and liked videos of 
other crew members.49 In addition, after Asheem was arrested for his 
crimes, he was also indicted on conspiracy charges, largely on the strength 
                                                                                                                 
 43. Joseph, supra note 41.  
 44. Victoria Cavaliere, More than 100 Indicted in Harlem in Largest-Ever NYC Gang 
Bust, REUTERS (June 4, 2014, 9:15 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-crime-
gangs/more-than-100-indicted-in-harlem-in-largest-ever-nyc-gang-bust-idUSKBN0EF1DQ 
20140604.  
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See generally Ben Popper, How the NYPD Is Using Social Media to Put Harlem 
Teens Behind Bars, VERGE (Dec. 10, 2014, 1:15 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2014/12/10/ 
7341077/nypd-harlem-crews-social-media-rikers-prison. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
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of online pictures showing him with other crew members.50 Jelani 
ultimately spent two years on Rikers Island, including roughly nine months 
in solitary confinement, before his case was finally dropped and he was let 
out.51 As it turns out, there was no case against Jelani; despite that, he spent 
two formative years in jail, largely on the basis of social media “evidence.” 
2. Sondra Arquiett  
As part of an investigation, the DEA seized a cell phone belonging to 
Sondra Arquiett, using pictures that were on it of her and her children—to 
impersonate her on Facebook.52 Using the pictures of Ms. Arquiett and her 
children, the DEA set up a fake account and pretended to be her in order to 
gather information about a drug-trafficking ring.53 Ms. Arquiett eventually 
learned of the impersonation and sued the DEA for putting her life and her 
children’s life in danger by implicating her in the undercover scheme.54 The 
agency settled with Ms. Arquiett for a little over $100,000.55 
V. Constitutional Issues Arising from the Use of Social Media Monitoring 
by Law Enforcement 
Knowing how the police use, or misuse, social media begs the question: 
Are the police violating the Constitution when they gather information in 
this way? There is no federal law, and as far as I am aware no state or local 
law, that limits how law enforcement can use social media. Some police 
departments have internal policies explicating their use of social media, but 
very few police departments actually publish those policies, as discussed in 
Part II. Despite these bleak statistics, some police departments may provide 
their officers guidance and training on how to use social media 
appropriately, but, again, few agencies do this. 
                                                                                                                 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Sari Horwitz, Justice Dept. Will Review Practice of Creating Fake Facebook 
Profiles,  
 WASH. POST (Oct. 7, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/justicedept-will-review-practice-of-creating-fake-facebook-profiles/2014/10/07/3f 
9a2fe8-4e57-11e4-aa5e-7153e466a02d_story.html. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. David Kravets, DEA Settles Fake Facebook Profile Lawsuit Without Admitting 
Wrongdoing, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 20, 2015), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2015/01/dea-settles-fakefacebook-profile-lawsuit-without-admitting-wrongdoing/.  
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So, if there are no on-point laws preventing surveillance of social media 
by the police, what does the constitutional landscape look like? The first 
possible constitutional avenue for contesting social media monitoring 
would be the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures. Traditionally, this would be challenging. The public 
space doctrine has traditionally held that when someone does something in 
public that can be seen by another individual, they have no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in that action, and that a police officer can therefore 
also watch what they are doing without a warrant.56 So, for example, if 
someone is driving down the road, any other driver on the road—including 
a law enforcement officer—can see that person, and the original driver 
therefore has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements on the 
road. Similarly, if a social media user posts something publicly, anyone 
with access to that social media site can see it; the public space doctrine as 
historically interpreted would hold that user has no reasonable expectation 
of privacy. 
Another doctrine that could pose difficulties in the Fourth Amendment 
context is the third-party doctrine. Essentially, the third-party doctrine 
presumes that anytime someone hands information over to someone else, or 
speaks to someone else, the speaker takes the risk that the receiver is a 
government agent or may give that information to a government agent. 
Courts are unsympathetic to the defense that the speaker was 
communicating in confidence.57 In general, when the third-party doctrine is 
applied to instances involving social media—for instance, if a user 
befriends an undercover cop on social media and divulges important 
information to the seemingly innocuous fake profile—courts have held that 
accepting a friend request from another user is akin to connecting with 
someone in real life, and that the user therefore takes the risk that the other 
profile could be a government agent.58 
                                                                                                                 
 56. See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 276 (1983) (“A person traveling in 
an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
movements.”). 
 57. The modern third-party doctrine traces its roots to a series of cases from the 1960s 
and 1970s. The principle was clearly articulated in United States v. Miller, where the Court 
“held that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to 
a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is 
revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence 
placed in the third party will not be betrayed.” United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 
(1976) (citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971); Hoffa v. United States, 385 
U.S. 293, 302 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963)). 
 58. See, e.g., United States. v. Gatson, No. 13-705, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173588, at 
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Following on these doctrines, courts so far have held that the use of 
online undercover accounts by police is not a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. But that may be starting to change. The U.S. Supreme Court is 
beginning to see that technology has so significantly expanded what the 
government and law enforcement can do with such little effort that the 
constitution may require a more robust response.59  
For example, one area where the Supreme Court has curtailed police 
departments’ use of monitoring technology is with GPS trackers. Typically, 
if a police department wants to tail a vehicle to track its movements, it 
would assign officers to keep surveillance on the vehicle or the individual’s 
whereabouts without the need for a warrant.60 In order to do so, the police 
department would have to determine that it was worth expending police 
resources and manpower to maintain that particular surveillance.61 With 
GPS trackers, a police officer can affix a GPS tracker to a specific vehicle 
and then track its movements, minute-by-minute, remotely via the GPS 
tracker’s signals. This method is much cheaper for police departments to 
employ and is also very revealing because of its accuracy. Therefore, a 
plurality of the Court has indicated that even though police officers can 
follow a vehicle down the street in public spaces, they cannot use a GPS 
tracker to record an individual’s detailed movements without a warrant.62 
There is an argument that police monitoring of social media is an equally 
intrusive violation of constitutional rights—certainly through the kinds of 
third-party tools that are now largely no longer available to law 
enforcement, and even with the more retail (as opposed to wholesale) 
monitoring tactics that are still available. Police can gather a lot of 
information to track what certain users post, which hashtags they use, and 
with whom they are connected. And they can do all this for multiple users, 
while sitting at their desks. That is powerful surveillance technology that 
starts to look a lot like putting a GPS on a car and gleaning all of that 
information about the driver.  
                                                                                                                 
*60 (D.N.J. Dec. 16, 2014); United States v. Meregildo, 883 F. Supp. 2d 523 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012); see also Jordan Crook, Police Can Create Fake Instagram Accounts to Investigate 
Suspects, TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 24, 2014), https://techcrunch.com/2014/12/24/police-can-
create-fake-instagram-accounts-to-investigate-suspects/. 
 59. See generally Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018); Riley v. 
California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
 60. Jones, 565 U.S. at 429-31 (J. Alito, concurring). 
 61. See id. 
 62. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 404, 413. 
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What about the third-party doctrine? The Supreme Court recently held in 
Carpenter v. United States that law enforcement must obtain a warrant to 
get a week or more of historical cell site location information from a cell 
phone provider, even though the provider is a “third party” in this 
scenario.63 The Court reasoned that the data could not truly be said to have 
been “voluntarily” shared with the provider, since “apart from 
disconnecting the phone from the network, there is no way to avoid leaving 
behind a trail of location data.”64 This data can reveal whom a person is 
with, where they go, where they sleep at night or work during the day, and 
more. Although it is not yet clear how or if this reasoning might apply in 
the social media context, it is nevertheless a chink in the armor of the third-
party doctrine. 
Advanced social media monitoring tactics could also complicate the 
application of the third-party doctrine to social media interactions. The best 
example is the case of Sondra Arquiett, discussed supra in Part IV. There, 
the DEA confiscated pictures from her phone and used them to create a 
fake profile impersonating Ms. Arquiett. People who were interacting with 
the fake Sondra Arquiett account thought they knew with whom they were 
conversing, but instead there were DEA agents behind the fake account, 
while the users were deprived of even the opportunity to make the kind of 
face to face judgments one could do in person. Although this is a largely 
unexplored area thus far, courts could handle these situations differently 
because of the heightened difficulty in unmasking an impersonator online. 
Another avenue for constitutional challenge is the First Amendment. 
When police target social activists and political protest groups on social 
media—as was done in Memphis, Boston, and Oregon—the police are 
largely monitoring First Amendment-protected actions and, in some cases, 
taking action based on that monitoring. The Supreme Court has recently 
said that cyberspace, and especially social media, is now the most important 
space for the exchange of views, so social media is clearly being viewed as 
a First Amendment-protected space.65 Therefore, if the government or law 
                                                                                                                 
 63. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217, 2221.  
 64. Id. at 2219-20.  
 65. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017) (“While in the past 
there may have been some difficulty in identifying the most important places (in a spatial 
sense) for the exchange of views, today the answer is clear. It is cyberspace—the ‘vast 
democratic forums of the Internet’ in general, and social media in particular.” (quoting Reno 
v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997))); see also Hassan v. City of New 
York, 804 F.3d 277, 292 (3d Cir. 2015) (holding that when discriminatory government 
surveillance dissuades individuals from exercising their rights, they can challenge the 
surveillance under the First and Fourteenth Amendments). 
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enforcement were to monitor or surveil an individual on social media in 
retaliation for his or her First Amendment-protected activity, the user would 
arguably have a First Amendment claim against the government. 
Finally, knowing that police departments around the country are 
monitoring social media for surveillance purposes, and knowing the 
fallibility and opportunities for misuse that come with social media 
surveillance, how should legislators approach this unsettled area of law? 
While viewing social media profiles may be appropriate and necessary in 
some cases, there must also be strict limitations on the police’s use of social 
media surveillance tools. Law enforcement agencies engaging in social 
media monitoring should implement policies governing their use of social 
media monitoring and publish those guidelines publicly. There should be 
transparency about the use of social media, procedures for dealing with 
misuse, and available oversight procedures. Finally, there must be 
limitations on the use of undercover accounts, the monitoring of First 
Amendment-protected activity, and surveillance of juveniles. While such 
steps may not entirely mitigate the risks arising from police surveillance of 
social media, they would be a step in the right direction. 
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